How many wars are there currently in the world

Argos AO. Privacy Policy Feedback. The world at war: Stunning interactive map reveals EVERY conflict currently active around the world Created by non-profit organisation IRIN, it allows users to easily see key points of each conflict Map is part of a series of articles looking at the 'forgotten wars' around the world By Mark Prigg For Dailymail.

To see more about each conflict, click on the dot. Share this article Share. When I looked at the locations where conflict rage Most watched News videos Drug dealers face jail sentence after bragging about money on camera Members of the royal family attend annual Festival of Remembrance Kate Middleton: William has told me 'a lot about Sandhurst' PM: Loopholes that allow MPs to claim rent 'need to be looked at' Extinction Rebellion protesters moved by police at Lord Mayor's Show Groom crashes Lamborghini on wedding night and ends up in hospital Hit-and-run killer caught on CCTV as he ploughs into grandfather Boris Johnson: It's 'very difficult' to turn migrants back at sea Moment Belarus troops shine strobes and lasers at the Polish army Prince Charles delighted by magic trick during south London visit Prime Minister Boris Johnson warns Covid 'sadly still remains a risk' Moment over 1, kebabs are delivered to migrant camp in Dover.

Comments Share what you think. View all. A string of incidents in the Gulf in the past year, culminating in the 14 September attack against Saudi energy facilities, underscored how the U. Meanwhile, recurrent Israeli military strikes against Iranian and Iran-linked targets inside Syria and Lebanon — as well as in Iraq and the Red Sea basin, according to Tehran — present a new, dangerous front.

Any of these flash points could explode, by design or by accident. The potential for conflict has also prompted efforts, led by French President Emmanuel Macron, to help the U.

President Donald Trump, eager to avoid war, has been willing to hear out his proposal, and the Iranians are also interested in any proposition that provides some sanctions relief. But with deep distrust, each side has tended to wait for the other to make the first concession. A diplomatic breakthrough to de-escalate tensions between the Gulf states and Iran or between Washington and Tehran remains possible.

But, as sanctions take their toll and Iran fights back, time is running out. The days of , when U. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un hurled insults at each other and exchanged threats of nuclear annihilation, seemed distant during most of But tensions are escalating.

The dangers of yielded to a calmer and early The U. The first — in Singapore in June — produced a flimsy statement of agreed principles and the possibility of diplomatic negotiations. The second — in Hanoi in February — collapsed when the gulf between the two leaders on the scope and sequencing of denuclearisation and sanctions relief became clear. Since then, the diplomatic atmosphere has soured.

In April , Kim unilaterally set an end-of-year deadline for the U. In June, Trump and Kim agreed, over a handshake in the demilitarised zone that separates the two Koreas, to start working-level talks. In October, however, an eight-hour meeting between envoys in Sweden went nowhere. The two leaders have at times floated the idea of a third summit, but they have backed away at least for the time being.

That may be for the best: another ill-prepared meeting could leave both sides feeling dangerously frustrated. Meanwhile, Pyongyang — which continues to seek leverage to obtain sanctions relief and an end to joint military drills — stepped up short-range ballistic missile tests, which are widely understood not to be covered by the unwritten freeze.

North Korea seemed to be motivated by both practical reasons tests help perfect missile technology and political ones those tests appear intended to pressure Washington to propose a more favourable deal. In early December, Pyongyang went further, testing what appeared to be the engine for either a space-launch vehicle or a long-range missile and related technology, at a site that Trump claimed Kim had promised to dismantle.

Yet both sides should think about what will happen if diplomacy fails. If the North escalates its provocations, the Trump administration could react much like it did in , with name-calling and efforts to further tighten sanctions and by exploring military options with unthinkable consequences. That dynamic would be bad for the region, the world, and both leaders. The best option for both sides remains a confidence-building, measure-for-measure deal that gives each modest benefits.

Pyongyang and Washington need to put in the time to negotiate and gauge possibilities for compromise. In , Trump and Kim should steer clear of high-level pageantry and high-drama provocations, and empower their negotiators to get to work.

After falling off the international radar for years, a flare-up between India and Pakistan in over the disputed region of Kashmir brought the crisis back into sharp focus. Both countries lay claim to the Himalayan territory, split by an informal boundary, known as the Line of Control, since the first Indian-Pakistani war of First came a February suicide attack by Islamist militants against Indian paramilitaries in Kashmir.

India retaliated by bombing an alleged militant camp in Pakistan, prompting a Pakistani strike in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Not only that: before announcing its decision, it brought in tens of thousands of extra troops, imposed a communications blackout, and arrested thousands of Kashmiris, including the entire political class, many of whom were not hostile to India.

These moves have exacerbated an already profound sentiment of alienation among Kashmiris that will likely further fuel a long-running separatist insurgency. Separately, the Indian government's new citizenship law, widely regarded as anti-Muslim, has sparked protests and violent police responses in many parts of India.

Internet access remains cut off, soldiers deployed in August are still there, and all Kashmiri leaders remain in detention. But its cause is hardly helped by its long record of backing anti-India jihadis.

Moreover, most Western powers see New Delhi as an important partner. They are unlikely to rock the boat over Kashmir, unless violence spirals. The gravest danger is the risk that a militant attack sets off an escalation. In Kashmir, insurgents are lying low but still active. A strike on Indian forces almost certainly would precipitate Indian retaliation against Pakistan, regardless of whether Islamabad is complicit in the plan.

In a worst-case scenario, the two nuclear-armed neighbours could stumble into war. External actors should push for rapprochement before it is too late. Both sides are playing to domestic constituencies in no mood for compromise.

Resuming bilateral dialogue, on hold since , is essential and will necessitate concerted pressure, particularly from Western capitals. Any progress requires Pakistan taking credible action against jihadis operating from its soil, a non-negotiable precondition for India to even consider engaging.

For its part, India should lift the communication blackout, release political prisoners, and urgently re-engage with Kashmiri leaders.

Both sides should resume cross-border trade and travel for Kashmiris. If a new crisis emerges, foreign powers will have to throw their full weight behind preserving peace on the disputed border. But his government remains isolated and bereft of resources, while most Venezuelans suffer from crushing poverty and collapsing public services. Despite hardship, poor communities remained mostly unconvinced by the opposition.

Gold exports and cash dollars kept the country afloat and enriched a tiny elite. Many of those left out joined the mass exodus of Venezuelans, now numbering 4. The crisis is having other ripple effects. The UN estimates that 7 million Venezuelans need humanitarian aid, many of them in border areas patrolled by armed groups, including Colombian guerrillas. Though sharing more than 1, miles of criminalised, violent, and largely unguarded border, the Colombian and Venezuelan governments no longer talk to each other, instead trading insults and blame for sheltering armed proxies.

With the U. The omens are not overly promising. Government-opposition talks facilitated by Norway were suspended in September. But there is still a negotiated way out of the turmoil. It would entail compromise from all sides: the opposition would need to drop its demand that Maduro leave now; the government would have to accept steps ensuring a credible and internationally monitored parliamentary election in as well as an early — and equally credible — presidential poll in the near future; and the U.

Yet if peace seems slightly more plausible than it did a year ago, it is far from preordained. But the agreements remain unimplemented as Kyiv and Moscow disagree on their specifics and sequencing. Zelenskyy pledged while campaigning to make peace.

He started by negotiating mutual withdrawals from front-line positions and a ceasefire with Russia and its proxies. The leaders failed to agree on Minsk sequencing but left with plans for a more comprehensive ceasefire, further disengagement at front-line positions, increased Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe monitoring, and new crossing points for civilians at the line of contact separating Ukrainian and separatist forces.

This gives him more room for maneuver. If things go as planned, the next meeting in France, set for spring, should tackle other components of the Minsk agreement, including amnesties, further troop withdrawals, and a path to reintegrating separatist-held areas into Ukraine.

Much could go wrong. Even beyond rural areas, citizens are growing angrier at their governments. Similar discontent plagues Niger and Burkina Faso. Broadly speaking, such efforts would require state actors and others to focus first and foremost on mediating local conflicts, talking to militants where necessary, and using the resulting agreements as the basis for the return of state authority to the countryside.

Foreign military operations are essential, but international actors ought to emphasise local peacemaking and push for governance reform. Little suggests the military-first approach will stabilise the Sahel. If anything, over recent years it appears to have contributed to the uptick in inter-ethnic bloodshed and Islamist militancy.

COVID has exacerbated the suffering of civilians already stalked by poverty, hunger, and other diseases. Top humanitarian officials are again warning of famine. One year ago, there was a window of opportunity to end the war, but the belligerents squandered it.

Huthi rebels were talking through back channels with Saudi Arabia, the main outside sponsor of the U. Combined, these two negotiating tracks could have served as building blocks for a U. It took a year of bad-tempered negotiations before anti-Huthi factions agreed on how they would divvy up security responsibilities in the south, move their forces away from front lines, and form a new government. The negotiations will likely face further roadblocks over relocating the cabinet to Aden.

UN peacemaking efforts have also hit a wall. Both the Huthis and the Hadi government have reasons to stall. The government can ill afford to lose Marib, but it harbours another hope: the outgoing Trump administration may, in a parting shot at Iran, designate the Huthis a terrorist organisation, tightening the economic noose on the rebels and complicating negotiations with them by outside actors.

Such a step would heighten risks of famine by obstructing trade with Yemen, which imports 90 per cent of its wheat and all of its rice.

It might also sound the death knell for UN mediation efforts. In any case, the UN two-party framework looks outdated. Yemen is no longer the country it was in the early days of the war; it has fragmented as the conflict raged. The Huthis and the government do not hold a duopoly over territory or domestic legitimacy.

Other local actors have interests, influence, and spoiling power. The UN should expand its framework to include others, notably the STC and Emirati-backed forces on the Red Sea coast along with tribespeople in the north, who could otherwise upend any settlement they reject. Instead of pursuing a two-party bargain, the UN should start planning for a more inclusive process that would encourage deal-making among key players.

Absent a course correction, looks set to be another bleak year for Yemenis, with the war dragging on, disease and potentially famine spreading, prospects for a settlement evaporating, and millions of Yemenis getting sicker and hungrier by the day. Nearly two years have passed since the Venezuelan opposition, the U. Today, any such hopes lie in tatters. If anything, these actions have left him stronger, as allies, including in the military, have rallied behind him fearing his fall would endanger them.

If Maduro remains entrenched, his adversaries could see their political fortunes collapse. Now the opposition is weak, divided, and with barely a toehold in the National Assembly. Most families that remain cannot put enough food on the table. Thousands of children are suffering irreversible harm from malnutrition. A new U. Support for the Venezuelan opposition has been bipartisan in Washington. Internationally backed negotiations aimed in particular at organising credible presidential elections, scheduled for , could come next, provided both sides show they are genuinely interested in compromise.

Most of his rivals want to overthrow and prosecute him. A settlement looks as distant as ever. But after two years spent in fruitless and harmful efforts to provoke sudden political rupture, building support for a more gradual transition is the best path forward.

The war against Al-Shabaab is entering its fifteenth year, with no end in sight, while donors increasingly chafe at paying for African Union AU forces to help keep the militants at bay. The mood ahead of the elections — parliamentary elections were scheduled for mid-December but have been pushed back, and preparations for a presidential vote planned for February are also lagging — is fraught. Al-Shabaab, meanwhile, remains potent. While Somali leaders and their international partners all recognise, in principle, that the challenge from Al-Shabaab cannot be tackled with force alone, few articulate clear alternatives.

To further complicate things, patience is wearing thin with the AU mission that has for years battled Al-Shabaab. Without those forces, major towns, potentially even Mogadishu, would be even more vulnerable to militant assaults. Donors like the EU are tired of forking out for what appears to be a never-ending military campaign.

The current plan is to hand over primary security responsibility to Somali forces by the end of , yet those troops remain weak and ill-prepared to lead counter-insurgency efforts. Much hinges on the February presidential vote.

A contested vote, on the other hand, could provoke a political crisis that widens the gulf between Mogadishu and the regions, potentially triggers clan violence, and risks emboldening Al-Shabaab. Rival military coalitions in Libya are no longer fighting, and the UN has restarted negotiations aimed at reunifying the country. But reaching lasting peace will still be an uphill struggle. The fighting had killed some 3, people and displaced hundreds of thousands.

Front lines are now frozen in central Libya. The ceasefire is welcome, but its implementation is lagging. The LNA and GNA committed to withdraw troops from front lines, expel foreign fighters, and stop all foreign military training. Yet both sides have backtracked. Their forces are still on the front lines, and foreign military cargo planes continue to land at their respective air bases, suggesting that outside backers are still resupplying both sides.

Similarly, progress has been stunted in reunifying a country divided since UN talks convened in November brought together 75 Libyans tasked with agreeing on an interim unity government and a roadmap to elections. But talks have been marred by controversy over how the UN selected these delegates, their legal authority, infighting, and allegations of attempted bribery.

The participants have agreed to elections at the end of but not on the legal framework governing those polls. At the heart of all the problems is a disagreement over power sharing.

His rivals oppose including pro-LNA leaders in any new dispensation. Foreign powers have similarly contrasting views. Turkey wants a friendly government — free of Haftar supporters — in Tripoli. Russia, which also supports the LNA, is keen to retain its foothold in the Mediterranean, but whether it prefers the status quo that preserves its sway in the east or a new government with LNA representation is unclear.

Fighting seems unlikely to flare back up in the immediate future because outside actors, while keen to consolidate their influence, do not want another round of open hostilities. But the longer the ceasefire terms go unfulfilled, the higher the risk of mishaps provoking a return to war.

In January , the U. The new U. But doing so quickly, managing relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel — both bitterly opposed to Iran — and then moving to talks about broader regional issues will be no mean feat. That has meant exiting the JCPOA and imposing harsh unilateral sanctions on Iran in the hope of forcing greater concessions on its nuclear program, tempering its regional influence, and — some officials hoped — even toppling the government in Tehran.

Tehran has more accurate ballistic missiles than ever before and more of them.